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WHO IS THE JUDGE, AGENCY OR COURT?
JOHN W. CRAGUN'

If I mention the magic words "administrative law" to many lawyers
over this country, I get an uneasy reaction. Some will claim they don't
know what administrative law is; others claim they never touch the darn
stuff; others are aware of the magnitude of the place which this field
of the law has assumed, but feel baffled as to how to grapple with the
problems it raises in fulfilling their professional duties. I will not dwell
today on the place of administrative law in the state heirarchies, but with
the federal problem, the federal government having preempted so much
of the regulation of the economic life of our nation.
And when I speak of "administrative law" this audience should readily
realize that I am using merely a short, though fancy, word for a very
familiar process, the process of legislation and adjudication. It is a process
of legislation and adjudication carried on not by Congress and the Courts,
but by other organs of government which have been accorded the powers
of legislating or deciding law suits. The field of administrative law is the
field which deals with the powers and procedures of these other agencies
of government.
The last twenty-five years has seen rather a wholesale shift to the
agencies from the Congress and the Courts of the bulk of determinations
involving the rights and property of citizens. Today there are more federal
trial examiners that there are U. S. District Judges. They decide more
cases and I speak of ordinary law suits within the field of the particular
agency's authority, than do the federal courts themselves. The dollar
value of the cases they determine is far and away greater than what is
determined by the federal courts; and this is only one facet of agency
work.
Another with which we are concerned is their legislative function.
For those of you who subscribe to the Federal Register it comes as no
surprise to know that the actual output of legislation through the agencies
is vastly greater than that of Congress itself. The United States Code is a
compact little set of three volumes and supplement compared with the two
and one half shelves occupied by the Code of Federal Regulations. And
even the Code of Federal Regulations does not contain nearly all these
agency made statutes. In the smallest details of our ordinary lives we are
affected by this legislation. In a great part of this country we cannot flip
a light switch without affecting, sometimes hundreds of miles away, a
switchboard which must comply in detail with these agency statutes called
regulations. We cannot tune in a radio or television station; usually we
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cannot buy a stock or bond, nor can we market our wares and merchandise,
without being affected by this body of law. An unfortunate byproduct for
the lawyer from this standpoint is that frequently the interpretation of
these agency made statutes, and the building of the client, the handling of
his legal problems vis a vis the agency, even the trial of his lawsuits before
the agency, has become a function of some layman or lay group which
fosters the notion that the mere understanding or interpretation of these
laws is something actually beyond a lawyer's competence and in the realm
of the esoteric.
It seems to be the considered view of substantially everyone who has
studied and written on this phenomenon that the agencies are with us to
stay and that there cannot be a total reversal- of what has been done so as
to bring about a shifting back to Congress of the actual statute making
and a shifting back to courts of the trial and determination of the lawsuits
heretofore placed with the agencies. That is not to say that when a pattern
becomes sufficiently crystalized and sufficiently "judicialized" as the professors call it, in a particular agency that the agency cannot then become
a court. Thus, the court of Customs and Patent Appeals at length has
become a part of the federal Judicial system; and there is hearty endorsement from all except the lay practioners before it for the Tax Court of
the United States to be transferred from its present status as a merely administrative court to the judicial branch of the Federal Government. The
same could be done with the purely judicial function of the National
Labor Relations Board, or with those of the Federal Trade Commission.
There are others. But this vast administrative herarchy cannot be totally
resolved back into the pattern of our traditional theory of separation of
powers. Possibly this country would not have gone further and faster
had we continued more closely to respect our fundamental theory of
separation of powers and not have become so hypnotized with so-called
"expertise". Whether so or not, we give simple recognition to the practical
fact that the bureaucracies have taken so firm a grip on government
and business and everyday thought, they have so allied themselves with
the special interest or pressure groups which individually they are supposed to regulate in the public behalf, that any thought of limiting them
to police, investigative, prosecutive and similar functions while having
the courts try the lawuits and Congress do the substantial legislating is
mere dreaming.
Rather, the feasible solution has appeared plain; i.e., to insure that
there is essential fairness in the functions of the agencies. Our profession
has not stood still in this respect. It was lawyers, not the agencies, who
sponsored legislation in the early 1940's which, after veto and compromise,
finally emerged as the Administrative Procedure Act. That act was
approved in July, 1946. It sought to insure that the public would be
granted information as to the organization, the procedures, and the rules
of the various agencies; that the public and persons affected would be
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accorded a degree of participation in so-called "rule making" which is the
process by which agencies adopt these statutes called regulations; that fair
trials of "ajudicatory" proceedings would be guaranteed, which means that
where the agencies act in the trial of cases which might have been tried
by United States Districts courts the agencies are bound to give the lifigants some of the same guarantees of fairness to which the public feels
entitled in our courts of law; and finally to accord a better scope of
judicial review of agency proceedings so that no longer would the agencies
be a law unto themselves.
So far as that act went it has worked out satisfactorily. To be sure,
not always have the courts accorded the scope of judicial review which
the proponents of the legislation had hoped they might; but then neither
have the courts refused to apply the act in some situations where the
agencies contended it was inapplicable. Those agencies which initially
expressed misgivings about its operation, which sometimes forecast disaster
for the public interest, have found that the act works well in fact.
Inevitably, experience under the Administrative Procedure Act, experience of the agencies themselves, the industries they regulate, and the
public, has pointed to further improvements and has pointed to the
advisability of extending the principle of the Administrative Procedure
Act to other cases, and to the need to improve the draftsmanship of that
act.
Thus, the second Hoover Commission gave detailed consideration of
reforms needed in this field. Significant and detailed recommendations
were made in the report of that commission on Legal Services and Procedures, and in the underlying report of its task force on Legal Services
and Procedures of the Federal Government. Meantime, too, the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure had been called by the
President of the United States on April 29, 1953, and had brought the
federal agencies together for their own consideration of means of eliminating unnecessary delay and expense in agency procedures and had provided
detailed recommendations to the agencies.
Both of these thoughtful studies have in turn been given consideration
by lawyers throughout the United States for more than the last three
years. The various proposals have been debated and sifted in the light
of arguments advanced by the agencies, the litigants who appear before
them, the industries which are subject to regulation by the federal departments, boards and commissions, and the lawyers who appear on either
side of the controversies with which those agencies deal. Tried in the fire
of controversy which the many proposals for further reforms had provoked,
the American Bar Association adopted a statement of principles on this
subject at its mid-winter meeting in 1956.
In the intervening time since the first adoption of these principles by
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the American Bar Association, its committees have labored diligently to
bring forth a codification of the Administrative Procedure Act which
would give concrete form to the method through which these principles
could be carried into effect.
Let me read you just one of the resolutions which was adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1956 as a considered view and, therefore, a
guidepost to its Sections and Committees as to the reforms which should
be sought in the Administrative Procedure Act:
2. RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association sponsors the
enactment of a comprehensive Code of Federal Administrative Procedure
which will, among other features:
2.1 PUBLIC INFORMATION. Provide more adequately and effectively
for public information on the administrative process, including
(a) Broadening the requirements concerning publication of rules, statements of policy, interpretations and instructions, but providing appropriate means for authorizing short form or alternative methods where
desirable.
(b) Broadening the requirements concerning the publishing of orders
and final opinions, or in the alternative making them available for public
inspection.
(c) Requiring that no agency rule, statement of policy or interpretation
of statute intended to have general application or effect and required by a
statute or rule to be published shall, in any particular case, be a basis for
a sanction or a ground of decision unless previously so published; provided that this shall not preclude the formulation of ad hoc policies or
interpretations arrived at as a result of particular proceedings if clearly
within and relevant to the issues thereof.
(d) Developing the Code of Federal Regulations in order that it may be
made still more useful for public informational purposes.
2.2 RULE MAKING. Provide for improvements in the administrative
rule making process by
(a) Enlarging the applicability of formal hearing procedures by extending
such procedures to all rule making which any statute hereafter enacted
shall require to be made after a hearing unless such statute indicates an
intention to prescribe merely a legislative type of hearing, and further
providing for an examination to be made of previously enacted statutes
prescribing rule making hearings to determine whether or not formal procedures should appropriately be required in rule making thereunder.
(b) Broadening the coverage of provisions for notice and opportunity for
public participation in rule making where formal procedures are not required by eliminating in appropriate instances exceptions now included
in Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act so far as it may be done
without occasioning delay or expense disproportionate to the public
interest.
(c) Making applicable to formal rule making proceedings the principle
of separation of functions now established by the courts and by Section
5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
2.3. HEARINGS AND DETERMINATIONS. Provide for improvements
in the administrative hearing and decision processes by
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(a) Making applicable to agency members, informal adjudication and
formal rule making, the principle of separation of functions now established by the courts and by Section 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act.
(b) Providing that informal adjudication the rules of evidence and requirements of proof shall conform, to the extent practicable, with those in
civil or non-jury cases in the Federal Courts.
(c) Providing that in formal adjudication and formal rule making, where
the agency has not presided at the hearing, the hearing officer who has presided shall make and file an initial decision.
(d) Providing that in formal adjudication the hearing officer's findings
of evidentiary fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of fact, shall
not be set aside by the agency on review of the hearing officer's initial
decision unless such findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight
of the evidence.
2.4 JUDICIAL REVIEW. Provide for more effective judicial review of
agency proceedings by
(a), Providing that the scope of judicial review of agency determinations
of fact in formal proceedings be equivalent to the scope of review by the
United States Courts of Appeals of determinations of fact by United States
District Courts in civil non-jury cases.
(b) Providing that statutory interpretation in the course of agency adjudication be subject to full judicial review.
(c) Extending the scope of judicial review of the exercise of agency
discretion by authorizing judicial review where agency action constitutes
an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
(d) Authorizing reviewing courts, subject to appropriate safeguards and
upon a showing of irreparable damage, to enjoin at any stage of an agency
proceeding agency action clearly in excess of constitutional or statutory
authority.
(e) Providing for a prompt judicial remedy for every legal wrong resulting from agency action or inaction except where the Congress has
expressly precluded judicial review.
The 1956 resolutions referred to cognate provisions such as an independent office of administrative procedure to effect coordination of rules
and public information practices, regulate the appointment of hearing
examiners and their assignment to cases, regulate a career service for lawyers in government designed to make them more professionaly responsible,
establish courts in the federal judicial system to handle some of the lawsuits now tried by agencies, and to effect regulation of those who represent
others before the federal agencies. These resolutions I will not read.
Many of the aims of these other matters have been covered by bills introduced in the Congress which is has now adjourned. For that matter, so has
a draft of the bill to codify the Administrative Procedure Act, i.e., the bill
to establish a Code of Federal Administrative Procedure. This latter bill
was introduced as S. 4094 (85th Congress) by Senators Ervin and Butler.
Requests are pending from the Committee to the agencies for an expression
of views. The American Bar Association hopes to have hearings held at the
outset of the new Congress when the bill is re-introduced. Although
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there will be a storm of protest from the agencies just as there was with
the Administrative Procedure Act itself, it is the earnest hope of the
American Bar Association at large that the recommended improvements
in the administrative adoption of statutes and the administrative determination of lawsuits will be adopted by the next Congress.
The pattern of agency opposition is worth a note. Rather than
attempting to controvert the principles involved, which are plain and, I
submit, incontrovertable as I read them a few moments ago, the agencies
will be heard to set up a chant more or less as follows: This agency was set
up under a charter by Congress to look after the public interest in the
field of its jurisdiction (anything from the deepest mines to outer space).
This agency has functioned well. There is no genuine demand for
improvement of its practices or procedure or for greater review by the
courts; and any greater review by the courts would be time consuming
and constitute a delay in bringing about the fulfillment of the public
interest with which this agency is charged. While this agency does not
doubt. that some improvement could be effected, it submits that those
improvements ought to be considered in connection with the particular
statutory context which has been so carefully developed and devised to
support the public interest, rather than through an attempt to improve
them by a broadside bill such as the proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure.
As I say, this is the pattern of opposition with which the profession
is faced. The agency people, often shrill and insistent, refuse to examine
the principles or to meet them head on, but instead try to shift the burden
of proof, and principle be damned. The shallowness of this device in
opposition to the movement of the organized bar is obvious enough to
lawyers no matter how well it sounds to the agency, its staff, and the
people who are constantly before the agency and who with the agency
have come to a happy mutuality of views, an existing tidy situation which
they ardently do not want upset.
What I have said is a matter which I believe all of you know, or recall
upon being refreshed as to the history of the efforts of the organized bar to
bring common sense principle and fairness into play in the administrative
adoption of statutes and the administrative trial of lawsuits. So much for
a prelude, I wish to devote myself in the last minute to the matter which
concerns me above all others, the abdication by the courts of the control
and regulation of agencies in cases and controversies under Article III of
the Federal Constitution. This is a matter to which we as lawyers have
contributed, particularly those of us who have ascended the bench. I
refer to the natural desire of the courts to rid their calendars of a whole
class of cases and to leave the problems involved to the agencies, almost
without limit.
I ask you to recall Dr. Bernard Schwartz, the same man who directed
the hearings last spring which showed that deep freezes are not much
different from free trips and entertainment, that pastel minks are not
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greatly different from vicunas, and whose name is now part of our
language to describe the technique of hearings known as "Schwartzmanship." Years ago Dr. Schwartz wrote a blistering law review article entitled
"Administrative Remedies and The Exhaustion of Litigants." Were I to
write an article on the subject I might entitle it: "Let George Do It."
There is a similar doctrine, the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction"
which says that no matter how plain the facts and law are, if Congress
has committed any aspect of the matter to an agency then first you must
go through the whole gauntlet of procedures specified by the agency before
you can get to the courts at all. If the court gets rid of a case on the
docket in that way, it has postponed the evil day when it must hear and
determine one more case. Maybe the litigant will indeed be exhausted
before he comes back. Perhaps it is true that the matter presented is an
ordinary lawsuit between two ordinary parties involving only ordinary
issues of the construction of a statute or contract or right. Nonetheless,
since the individual can get a hearing before an agency, make him go
through the entire tortuous agency procedure (or the agency bull session,
as it has been described) even at the expense of a record including not
merely what is competent, relevant and material, but where anything
goes. Most litigants are exhausted by that time; but, if not, then time
enough to come to court.
The way we as lawyers contribute to this dismal process is through
paying our entire attention to the courts and not to the bulk or main
value of federal litigation. We are upset, we are appalled, at the law's
delay. We condemn and denounce the courts for their delay. We do
not examine the delay by the agencies. Thus, two weeks ago at Los
Angeles the Chief Justices of the States engaged in a bit of Soviet type
self examination and self abnegation, and joined in the chorus of denunciation of the courts for their unconscionable delays. But the courts could
learn from the federal agencies, which do not measure delay except from
the time the case is referred to a hearing examiner, which might be ten
years or so after it become ripe for referring to the hearing examiner.
Then, if the hearing examiner gets to it within a month or so, the agency
sweetly records that there has been only a month or so's lag. The courts
might learn to measure time from the day the case was placed on the
ready calendar or the daily trial assignment or whatever the local practice
points as the final act before actual trial.
I suggest that we ought to be more concerned with principle than
with time. We ought to be more concerned that a case is determined
correctly than that it is determined instantly. Justice can be denied as
well by erroneous decision as by mere delay and time consumed. There
ought to be no reward to a United States District Court by way of a happy
statistic or one more case disposed of that he has glommed onto a synthetic
reason, "primary jurisdiction", or "failure to exhaust administrative
remedies" and has denied justice in the particular case by sending the
litigant on an exhausting and unnecessary quest.

